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Introduction 
 
 Two dominant and conflicting theses concerning world order have emerged since the end 
of the Cold War.  They have found expression most directly and perhaps naively in the writings 
of two American political thinkers, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.  But the theses are 
far more widespread, far more divisive on the world scene, if given their full import.  Under their 
rubric fall the differences between the European Union and the United States in matters pertaining 
to war and peace, for example. 
 
 The first thesis was expressed by Fukuyama in an essay simply titled “The End of 
History?”, published in an obscure American journal in 1989.1  By the “end of history”, 
Fukuyama does not mean the end of events of this world, however momentous they might be, but 
the end of ideologies governing political and social organization which ultimately produce the 
events of the world.2  This “end of history” has been achieved through the success of liberal 
democracy as victorious over all other ideologies, most significantly over fascism3 and 
communism.  It is scarcely deniable that economic liberalism, “globalization” in contemporary 
currency, is pervasive.  What Fukuyama maintains is that political liberalism, where the state 
“recognizes and protects through a system of laws man’s universal right to freedom” and 
consequently where the state exists only with the consent of the governed, inevitably follows 
economic liberalism.  Fascism and communism, the last bastions of opposition to liberalism, 
showed themselves to be self-destructive, the former in its colossal failure in World War II both 
materially and ideally, the latter as it imploded economically and spiritually in the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
 
 Fukuyama asks, in the face of the collapse of fascism and communism, whether there are 
any other competing ideologies left or, what amounts to the same thing, whether there is 
something wanting in liberalism which another ideology might provide.  He considers religious 
fundamentalism – Christian, Jewish and Muslim –  briefly, attesting, he thinks, to the “spiritual 
vacuity” of liberal consumer societies, and while he recognizes this flaw in liberal secularity, he 
                                                           
1National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), followed in 1992 by The End of History and the Last Man, New York..  
Henceforth the article will be “End of History”. 
2See his “Reply to my Critics” in the subsequent issue of National Interest (Fall, 1989).  Henceforth “Reply”. 
3Fascism he defines as “any organized ultra nationalist movement with universalistic pretensions”, e.g. imperial 
Japan which sought to dominate its neighbours.  “End of History”, n. 11. 
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does not think religiously based societies could be successful, at least not in the West.4  If not 
religion, what of nationalism and other racial or ethnic ideologies: not the benign form of a 
cultural nostalgia but a thoroughgoing, systematic nationalism, arising from a desire for 
independence from some other dominant race or ethnic group.  “While they may constitute a 
source of conflict for liberal societies, this conflict does not arise from liberalism itself so much as 
from the fact that the liberalism in question is incomplete.”5  And while it is impossible a priori to 
rule out new more comprehensive ideologies or hidden contradictions in liberal democracy, two 
centuries of success suggest otherwise. 
 
 He considers finally the implications of the thesis of the “end of history” for international 
relations.  Post-historical states, the liberal democracies of the West who have reached their end, 
can be assumed to be preoccupied with a growing “Common Marketization” in international 
relations, the preoccupations of the countries of postwar Western Europe, “precisely those flabby, 
prosperous, self-satisfied, inward-looking, weak-willed states whose grandest project was nothing 
more heroic than the creation of the Common Market.”6  This does not mean the end of 
international conflict because there remain states still in history who might rise up against each 
other, or against post-historical states – ethnic and national violence, terrorism, wars of national 
liberation.  But large-scale war and large states still in the grip of history are what is passing 
away.  It is, Fukuyama muses, a rather sad thing too: “The struggle for recognition, the 
willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that 
called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, 
the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of 
sophisticated consumer demands.  In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor 
philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.”7  In the rejoinder to 
the critics of his essay, Fukuyama returns to these sentiments, stating his unflagging support for 
liberalism and his passionate belief in the superiority of liberal democracy over any other political 
order, yet aware also that “liberal states do not refer their citizens to higher aims beyond the 
responsibilities of general civic-mindedness ... This failure to address the question of the content 
of the good life is of course why liberalism works, but it also means that the vacuum that 
constitutes our freedom can be filled with anything: sloth and self-indulgence as well as 
moderation and courage, desire for wealth and preoccupation with commercial gain as well as 
love of reflection and pursuit of beauty, banality alongside spirituality ... there is a side of man 
that despises a riskless life, that seeks danger and heroism and sacrifice.”8 
 
 From the principle of freedom that inspires  liberal democracy, there must be a separation 
of Church and State; otherwise, the state would retain an element of coercion and man would not 
be free in it.  This might be interpreted, perhaps naively, as simply that the state is open alike to 
all religions, that “each is permitted to worship his maker after his own judgment”, in the eloquent 
words of John Tyler, tenth President of the United States.9  Such separation has been interpreted 
                                                           
4Only Islam offers a theocratic state as an alternative to liberal democracy and  “it is hard to believe that the 
movement will take on any universal significance,” he says! 
5“End of History”, 13. 
6Ibid., 5. 
7Ibid.,18. 
8Ibid.,28. 
9 “The United States have ventured upon a great and noble experiment, which is believed to have been hazarded in 
the absence of all previous precedent – that of total separation of Church and State.  No religious establishment by 
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less benignly as hostility to religion and all morality associated with religion.  But, as will appear 
in this paper, liberal democracy is itself a uniquely Christian invention.  There is consequently 
something wanting to liberal democracy, for what is essential to it leaves its citizens adrift in a sea 
of possibilities, noble and ignoble, as Fukuyama recognized. 
 
 The second and opposite thesis, expressed by Huntington, first appeared in an article in 
Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993, “The Clash of Civilizations”.10  From the wars of religion 
culminating in the Thirty Years War which ended with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the 
wars of kings and princes ending with the French Revolution and its aftermath11, to nineteenth 
century conflicts between nation states12, these giving way with the Russian Revolution to 
ideological wars – liberal democracy and fascism, Nazism, communism – the history of conflict 
in the modern world, is not over as Fukuyama supposed.  Rather, wars within Western civilization 
will be succeeded by conflicts between “the West and the Rest”13, clashes great and small 
between “civilizations”14, broad cultural entities usually encompassing several nations with 
perhaps one as center, having a common culture and usually a common religion.  States formerly 
defined by ideology are disintegrating, to be replaced by communities defined by culture 
including ethnicity and religion, where former animosities against those of a different culture 
reappear as in the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.   Civilizational identity is forged 
in opposition and hostility to an “other”.  Western civilization is at the peak of its power, posing 
an unintended threat to other civilizations as it naively pursues its economic advantage and 
cultural expansion. 
 
 Huntington counters Fukuyama’s sanguine conviction that economic and political 
liberalism are ultimately irresistible with the observation that Western culture differs 
fundamentally from what prevails in non-Western cultures.  “Western ideas of individualism, 
liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, rule of law, democracy, free 
markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, 
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures,”15 and “the values that are most important in the 
West are least important worldwide.”16  Moreover, Western attempts to spread freedom and 
                                                           
law exists among us.  The conscience is left free for all restraint and each is permitted to worship his Maker after his 
own judgment.  The offices of Government are open alike to all.  No tithes are levied to support an established 
Hierarchy, not is the fallible judgment of man set up as the sure and infallible creed of faith.  The Mohammedan, if he 
will come among us would have the privilege guaranteed to him by the Constitution to worship according to the 
Koran; and the East Indian might erect a shrine to Brahma if it so pleased him ... the Hebrew persecuted and down 
trodden in other regions takes up his abode among us with none to make him afraid ... and the Aegis of the 
government is over him to defend and protect him.  Such is the great experiment which we have tried, and such are 
the happy fruits which have resulted from it; our system of free government would be imperfect without it.” In a 
letter dated July 10, 1843, quoted in Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 3 
(September, 1990). 
10Followed by his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, 1996. Henceforth 
Clash.  The article henceforth “Clash”. 
11Hegel describes Napoleon during the Battle of Jena in 1806 as “the World Spirit on horseback”.   
12Huntington quotes R.R. Palmer: “The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun.” 
13“The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be ...the conflict between ‘the West and the Rest’ and the 
responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values.” “Clash”, 21. 
14The world’s “civilizations”, which number “seven or eight” in Huntington’s reckoning, include Western, 
Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African. 
15“Clash”, 30.  
16“Clash”, 45, quoting a study by Harry C. Triandis. 
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equality abroad, to promote free elections, for example, can backfire with quite undesirable 
consequences.  He notes that in many Arab countries, as they reach new levels of economic and 
social development, autocracy is giving way to democratically elected governments which have 
given new power to Islamic movements.  “In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy 
strengthens anti-Western political forces.”17  More generally, economic globalization and the 
spread of Western culture are interpreted by many non-Western communities as simply the latest 
form of Western, or specifically American, imperialism.  The United Nations Security Council 
and the International Monetary Fund routinely promote Western interests in the name of the 
world community.18  “The very phrase ‘the world community’ has become the euphemistic 
collective noun (replacing ‘the Free World’) to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the 
interests of the United States and other Western powers.”19 
 
 The civilization most vigorously resistant to foreign incursion – especially Western 
incursion – is Islam.  Unlike other civilizations which are situated in a specific territory, Muslims 
form the majority in several countries and significant minorities all over the globe.  The umma, 
the worldwide community of Muslims at any given time, is a “civilization” in Huntington’s 
scheme: it encompasses a religion but more than a religion, a total integration of all human 
interests of its members.  It is not limited to a nation, ethnicity or locale.  Where its members do 
occupy a particular state, Huntington says “it has bloody borders”, violent conflicts with its 
neighbours (including Muslim neighbours).20   Wherever the umma is present, it is not absorbable 
in larger cultures.  Muslim people are “indigestible” in Huntington’s description, they do not 
easily assimilate.  Dividing the world into dar al-islam, the “House of Submission” and dar al-
harb, the “House of Warfare”, Muslims are inoculated against those outside the umma, and even 
when they have immigrated to a foreign culture, as in Western Europe and North America, they 
live in self-imposed isolation from their hosts. 
 
 Huntington maintains that Christianity will soon be overtaken by Islam as the dominant 
religion.  Though this thesis is disputed by specialists on global religion21 the point that Western 
Christianity is in significant decline over against a resurgent Islam is undeniable.  Huntington’s 
principal thesis in this context is that Western domination economically and politically is bound 
to recede, to show itself as a mere “two-hundred-year Western blip on the world economy.”22  
Attacking Fukuyama head on, he declares , “The West won the world not by superiority of its 
ideas or values or religion ... but rather by its superiority  in applying organized violence.  
Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.”23 The decline of Western power will 
                                                           
17When the “free” election in Algeria resulted in a victory for the extremists, the military saw the need to take over, 
with continuing disastrous results. 
18The Security Council legitimated the first Gulf War, demanded that Libya turn over the Lockerbie bombing 
suspects and imposed sanctions when Libya refused, examples Huntington provides. 
19“Clash”, 27. 
20“Clash”, 20.  In Clash, 256, he provides statistics to justify the assertion that “wherever one looks along the 
perimeter of Islam, Muslims have problems living peacefully with their neighbors.” 
21Notably by Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom, Oxford, 2002, who highlights the massive 
growth of Christian populations in the global south. 
22Clash, 88. 
23 Clash, 51. 
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be followed by a retreat of Western culture, for even as non-Western civilizations increasingly 
develop and prosper, “...modernization does not equal Westernization.”24 
 
Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western.  
To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest.  Non-Western civilizations will 
continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that 
are part of being modern.  They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their 
traditional culture and values.  Their economic and military strength relative to the West 
will increase.  Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western 
modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and 
interests differ significantly from those of the West.25 
 
 Following the events of September 11, 2001, Huntington’s anticipation of civilizational 
clash and violent confrontation especially with Islam seems remarkably prescient.  As Stanley 
Kurtz writes, “This is Samuel P. Huntington’s moment.”26  If Western leaders including British 
Prime Minister Blair and President Bush publicly proclaim that present strife is only against an 
extremist fringe and not the Muslim world itself, Huntington demurs.27  He gives this further 
account: 
 
The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism.  It is Islam, a 
different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are 
obsessed with the inferiority of their power.  The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the 
U.S. Department of Defense.  It is the West, a different civilization whose people are 
convinced of the universality of their culture. 
 
 Fukuyama’s optimistic vision of a universal end of history in a worldwide embrace of 
“modernity” characterized by liberal institutions of democracy, individual freedom and a free 
economy is countered by Huntington’s dark predictions of a clash of civilizations, Western liberal 
democracy just one among several alternatives at war with one another.  Huntington predicts the 
non-viability of Western domination while Fukuyama expresses its total victory in the long run.  
Huntington warns of the dangers of Western arrogance while Fukuyama is confident that all 
cultures will come to embrace Western values.  Fukuyama’s vision suffers from the boredom with 
which it ends, “... not with a bang but a whimper,” a matter not lost among thinking non-
Westerners.28  Huntington envisions conflict and violence of culture against culture, driven by 
religion , a return in another form to the wars of religion which ended with Westphalia – wars 
seemingly without end.  “Wherever one turns, the world is at odds with itself.” 29 
                                                           
24 “If not Civilizations, What?”, Foreign Affairs Nov./Dec., 1993, online at   http://www.foreignaffairs.org/  
25“Clash”, 49.   
26 Â   .“The Future of ‘History’”, Policy Review, N. 113, available online at 
http://policyreview.org/JUN02/kurtz.html.| Henceforth, Kurtz. 
27.“Muslim bellicosity and violence are late-twentieth-century facts which neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can 
deny.” Clash, 259. 
28.As Negrzad Boroujerdi observes, “Many people contend that Western modernity resembles a Faustian bargain in 
which you have to sacrifice your variant and traditional familial, tribal, ethnic, religious and national 
identities/attachments for the tediously monotonous materialism of the present age.”  “Iranian Islam and the Faustian 
Bargain of Western Modernity”, -----. 
29.“If not civilizations...” 
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 These two positions are in wonderful dialectical relation.  Confronting the same issue and 
coming to diametrically opposed conclusions, neither can be refuted by the other.  Neither 
position is falsifiable – Huntington’s because it is too nuanced with exceptions and ‘wiggle 
room’30, Fukuyama because he can (and does) appeal to the longer view, an eventual triumph of 
western values.31  As Stanley Kurtz observes, “The books [The End of History and The Clash of 
Civilizations] are at once complementary and irreconcilable.  Taken together they frame our 
current perplexity.”32   
 
 What is our current perplexity?  The question is can we in Western society live in peace 
with Islam.  From our side, democratic institutions and respect for individual freedom require that 
we embrace Muslims among us, even as we fear we are harbouring some among them who would 
destroy us.  From the Muslim side, the question is whether Islam can accept those outside the 
umma, its opposite the dar al-harb, as its equal, without succumbing to it.  The reflections here 
will examine the relation of religion to secularity, how the Christian religion can be understood as 
the foundation of Western secularity, and under what circumstances Islam can support a 
secularity not foreign to itself but one which could tolerate Western civilization.  Although the 
discussion here centers principally on the different relations of Islam and the Christian religion to 
secularity, the Jewish religion is drawn into the argument for the clarification it provides in 
understanding Islam.   
 
 
I.  Judaism, Islam And The Christian Religion 
 
 The UN “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, approved on December 10, 1948, 
states that we are all entitled to a set of human rights “without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status”.  Among the rights set forth are the civil and political rights to life, liberty, 
security, protection against torture and arbitrary arrest, equal protection of the law, freedom of 
movement, participation in government, religious freedom, freedom of assembly and association, 
and ownership of property.  The declaration offers no philosophical justification for these rights, 
simply stating that “the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights”.  Jacques Maritain in 1951 referred to this international consensus as a 
kind of “secular faith”.33   But after some years, all three religious traditions we shall examine 
here have claimed these rights as rooted in their traditions.34  We shall be in a position 
                                                           
30.As Glenn Perry observes, “It becomes impossible to use facts to refute a generalization whose advocate himself 
proclaims that it is ‘highly simplified’, and that it ‘omits many things, distorts some things, and obscures others’ 
(p.29).”  “Huntington and his Critics: the West and Islam – Samuel H. Huntington”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24 
(Winter 2002), 34.   
31.A month after 9-11, Fukuyama wrote, “We remain at the end of history ...” 
32. Kurtz. 
33.Cf.  Robert Traer, “Religious Communities in the Struggle for Human Rights”, Christian Century, September 28, 
1988, 835. 
34. Cf. Judaism and Human Rights, ed. Milton Konvitz, 1972, and Rabbi Daniel Polish in Human Rights in Religious 
Traditions, 1982, who states that the idea of human rights “derives in the Jewish tradition from the basic theological 
affirmation of Jewish faith.”  John Warwick Montgomery, Human rights and Human Dignity: an Apologetic for the 
Transcendent Perspective, 1986, provides a comprehensive argument that the rights set forth in the Universal 
Declaration are derived from inerrant teachings of the Bible.  And in 1981, the Islamic Foundation adopted and 
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subsequently  to assess these claims.  But first a brief treatment of the differences of these three 
religions, which unabashedly owes a great deal to Hegel’s treatment of these matters, as does the 
whole position of the paper. 
 
1.  Judaism 
   
 For religion to be possible there must be a difference of God and finite spirit, and there 
must be a relationship.  Thus, deism is not a religion – it expresses no relationship.  What kind of 
religion is Judaism?  Judaism is that “stern, stubborn, incorruptible witness to divine-human 
nonunion”35, and yet it is a religion.  In spite of the absolute difference of God and man, this is not 
irrelevance (as in deism) or indifference.  There is still union of human and divine, as the longing 
of the soul for God, for conformity to the will of God, or the prophet recognizing God as Lord, 
himself as servant.  But Judaism is antidote to those who would deny either human finitude or the 
Divine infinity.  God is “infinite power” in Judaism precisely as power over the finite; this infinite 
power as divine is not then mere necessity but the “power of wisdom”, and what it produces is a 
work of goodness and justice.36   Human life participates in the infinite divine purpose, knowing 
that divine alone is what is actual.  It participates precisely as a finite witness  to the divine-human 
nonunion, and for this reason such witness could only have reality in the life of a particular 
people.  To affirm the hidden unity of human and divine in which this difference is a moment is 
beyond Judaism.  But that moment of difference known immediately could only be particular.  
Job is symbolic of God’s whole dealings with the Jews – a defense of the finite spirit as well as its 
overcoming, the spirit which doubts and in expressing the doubt overthrows the doubt.  “Job is 
guiltless; he finds his misfortune unjustifiable and so is dissatisfied...He is dissatisfied precisely 
because he does not regard necessity as blind fate ... The critical point, then, occurs when this 
dissatisfaction and despondency has to submit to absolute, pure confidence.  The submission is 
the end point. That trust in God is none other than the consciousness of this harmony between 
power and wisdom.”37 
 Judaism thus holds together even in their contradictoriness the knowledge that God is the 
creator of all and that God is the God of a particular people. “This is the striking contrast, 
infinitely difficult, the most difficult of all.  On the one hand God is universal, the God of heaven 
and earth, the God of all humanity, absolute wisdom and universal power; on the other hand, his 
purpose and operation in the spiritual world are so limited as to be confined to just this one 
family, just this one people.”38  But “it is this people that worship him, and so he is the God of 
this people, he is its Lord in fact.”39  There is nothing here to take glory in, or to boast about, “the 
                                                           
published the “Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights”, which has become sufficiently authoritative to be 
cited in an Islamic court decision in Pakistan; it supports the UN Declaration, justifying and defining these rights 
from Islamic Law and the Qur’ n.    
35.Emil Fackenheim, “Hegel and Judaism: a Flaw in the Hegelian Mediation”, The Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of 
the Marquette Hegel Symposium, 1970, 1973, 164. 
36.Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, California, 1984, ii, 427-9 [1824 Lectures].  
Henceforth LPR; “Hegel and Judaism”, 164-5.  “What has been differentiated has no right to be, it is outside the one, 
it is a manifold and therefore a limited, finite thing whose destination is not to be; that it nonetheless is, is the 
goodness of God.”  “Justice in turn is the manifestation of the nullity or ideality of this finite being, it is the fact that 
this finite being is not genuine independence -- this manifestation of God as power is what endows finite things with 
their right.” 675 [1827 Lectures] 
37  LPR, iii, 681-2. 
38.LPR, ii, 436 (1824 Lectures). 
39.LPR, ii, 684. 
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enjoyment uniquely confined to this one people, and the relationship of this one people to the all-
powerful, omniscient God.”40   There is no sense of obligation to bring others to this religion, no 
proselytizing spirit in the Jewish people.  All peoples -- Jews and Gentiles --  are called upon to 
glorify his name [Ps. 117:1-2], but this remains only an idle wish, not a goal as later it will be for 
Islam.  It engenders no fanaticism, as it will in Islam.  “Fanaticism is found among the Jews, but 
only where their possessions or their religion comes under attack ...”41 
 
2. Islam 
 
 What kind of religion is Islam?  This is the subject of a recent article by Alain Besançon42.  
He observes that with respect to Islam the churches in Europe -- and here it is the same -- are 
inclined to an “indulgent ecumenism”.  We share, after all, at least these elements in common: 
Islam is a monotheism, grounded like Christianity and Judaism, in a divine revelation; its 
revelation is recorded in a book, the Qur’ n, “biblical” as it were as is the Hebrew Bible and the 
New Testament; and Islam claims a common descent with us from the biblical patriarch 
Abraham.  Moreover, Christians might remind themselves that the Qur’ n makes mention of Jesus 
and Mary and accords them an honoured status.  Is Islam, as Judaism and Christianity, to be 
regarded by Christians and Jews also as a “revealed religion”?  
 
 In traditional Christian theology, “revealed religion” is distinguished from “natural 
religion”, the latter more generic and primitive than the former.  Those who possess “natural 
religion” are bound by natural law and by the universal morality expressed simply as “Do good 
and avoid evil”.  In rabbinic theology, they fall under the covenant between God and Noah, struck 
with those who survived the flood, that is, all humanity (Genesis, ch.9).  They may have some 
elements of a true idea of God even within the framework of a pagan religion.  Then God chose 
from this common humanity, in the person of Abraham, a special people with whom he made 
another covenant, to whom in the person of Moses He revealed himself  as Yahveh.  These 
Chosen People are bound by the Law of Moses and know God as the one eternal God, as the 
entirely self-determined, self-sufficient substantiality who is because he is.  Finally, God 
established a new covenant through the person of his incarnate Son Jesus, the complete revelation 
of God, a covenant which will finally extend to all mankind.43  Thus, Judaism and Christianity are 
‘revealed religions”.   
 
 But what kind of religion is Islam?  After all, it proclaims Allah as One, eternal, almighty, 
beneficient, all knowing.  It claims to have received a revelation, one which moreover it claims is 
comprehensive of Judaism and Christianity, for Islam shares with them a common descent from 
Abraham and acknowledges Adam, Noah, Moses, David, Jesus too as true “messengers” (only 
Mohammed is God’s prophet); and the Qur’ n makes mention of Jesus and Mary according them 
an honoured status.  Besançon argues persuasively that the Qur’ n cannot be regarded by Jews 
                                                           
40.LPR, ii, 437. 
41.LPR, ii, 438. 
42.“What Kind of Religion is Islam?”, Commentary, May, 2004, 42-48.  Alain Besançon, the renowned  French 
Roman Catholic historian,  has written extensively on the what he regards as a false interpretation of Islam as he finds 
it in the Roman Catholic Church in general and the Church in France in particular.  He especially singles out these 
two theses: that the Qur’ n is a scripture in a certain continuity with Judeo-Christian scriptures, and that Islam falls 
within the Judeo-Christian Abrahamic tradition. 
43.Besançon, 42-43. 
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and Christians as continuous with their scriptures: Abraham of Genesis is not the Ibrahim of the 
Qur’ n, Moses is not Moussa44; Jesus, as Issa in the Qur’ n , appears out of place and time and 
without reference to Israel.  Mary (Mariam) is the sister of Aaron.  Issu gives the same message as 
the earlier prophets, Islam, i.e. the oneness of God (certainly not the Trinity).  He is neither “the 
Son of God” nor a mediator – in Islam there is no mediation.  Muhammad’s ignorance about the 
elements of the Christian religion is easily explained: there was no translation of the New 
Testament into Arabic available to him.45  He relied solely on oral accounts, clearly with elements 
of fanciful apocrapha and heretical additions.46 
 
 The message of Islam was infused into Adam, repeated by the subsequent “messengers” to 
particular people, and finally, because men forget the message, it was dictated to Muhammad, 
messenger and Prophet.  Only he received a mission to all mankind.  The books of the earlier 
messengers had become falsified, it was claimed, the writings manipulated and the meaning 
distorted.  Thus the true Torah, the authentic Gospel is found only in the Qur’ n, and Muslims are 
the true followers of Jesus.47  Whatever is true, then, is found in the Qur’ n, and if it is not found 
there then it is false.  Hegel gives this as the Muslim justification for the destruction of the noble 
Alexandrian library: Omar is reported to have said, “These books either contain what is in the 
Koran or something else.  In either case they are superfluous.”48 
 
 Since the Qur’ n is neither continuous nor consistent with the scriptures of Jews and 
Christians, they could not regard it as a true revelation of God.  But is Islam then some heretical 
version of one or the other, or should it be regarded rather as a “natural religion”?  It has in 
common with natural religions a sense of God as immediately evident, so that one would have to 
be perverse or insane not to believe that God (or the gods) exists; one does not need faith or a 
revelation to know the divine, but only to know that the divine is One.  Furthermore, Islamic 
ethics has much in common with pagan ethics.  “There is a Muslim spirit of carpe diem, a this-
worldly contentment that often fascinated Christians who may have seen in it a dim echo of the 
ancient, classical world.  There is nothing like the doctrine of original sin in Islam ...”49  
Moreover, eternal life as described in the Qur’ n is not a participation in the divine life, but rather 
a return to Eden, “those are they brought nigh the Throne, in the Gardens of Delight (a throng of 
the ancients and how few of the later folk) upon close-wrought couches reclining upon them, set 
face to face, immortal youths going round about them with goblets, and ewers, and a cup from a 
spring (no brows throbbing, no intoxication); and such fruits as they shall choose, and such flesh 
of fowl as they desire, and wide-eyed houris as the likeness of hidden pearls, a recompense for 
                                                           
44.Abraham is the common father first of Israel and then of Christians, but this is Adam for Muslims.  Ibrahim builds 
the Ka’ba temple and institutes the pilgrimage to Mecca. Ibid., 45. 
45.Cf. Samuel Hugh Moffatt, A History of Christianity in Asia, New York, 1992, 330: “But after at least three hundred 
years in Arabia, Christians, whether Calcedonian, Nestorian, or Monophysite, had made no translation of the New 
Testament into Arabic.”  A tradition relates that an Arab prince ordered a translation around the year 635, but “the 
earliest surviving fragments cannot be dated earlier than the ninth century.” Moffatt, 363, n.21.    
46.The Qur’ n denies that Christ died on the cross, for example.  He was, it states, rescued from the cross and another 
put in his place. 
47.Besançon, 44-5.This inclination to deny the truth of whatever stands opposed to the Qur’ n is frustrating to one 
who would wish to examine these differences objectively; it also accounts for the difficulty in converting Muslims, 
and even for moving them beyond their medieval mores and convictions.  Dialogue is only possible with Muslims 
who have moved beyond the literal acceptance of their scriptures. 
48.Philosophy of History, 360. 
49.Besançon, 46. 
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that they laboured.  Therein they shall hear no idle talk, no cause of sin, only the saying 'Peace, 
Peace!'” (Qur’ n, 56:15).  These are the very elements notoriously  promised to the martyr/suicide 
bomber.  
 
 Among the ninety-nine names for Allah, one will not find “Father”, or any personal name, 
for God in Islam is completely indeterminate. “God is himself the perfectly undefined, His 
activity is altogether abstract, ...the particulars produced thereby are perfectly contingent... The 
activity of God is thus represented as perfectly devoid of reason.”50 In the existent world nothing 
is fixed, nothing sensible exists by nature, the nature of this or that body does not entail its 
accidents.  Rather, God creates all accidents instantaneously, without causal mediation.   Only 
God is substantially; everything else is devoid of necessity, is absolutely changeable, changed at 
every instant.  For example, we have not really dyed the dress red when we believe we’re 
coloured it with red dye; rather, at that instant God has made the red colour the property of the 
dress, and continuously recreates the red colour instant by instant.51  Scientific knowledge is also 
an accident of this kind: we do not know today what we knew yesterday.  Hegel says, “All we can 
discern here is the complete dissolution of all interdependence, of everything that pertains to 
rationality. ...[God’s activity] is wholly abstract, and that is why the differentiating that has been 
posited by means of it is wholly contingent.... The Arabs developed sciences and philosophy in 
this way, where all is caprice.”52  
 
 The Qur’ n itself is similarly unsystematic.  There is no doctrine beyond “there is no god 
but Allah and Muhammad is his Prophet.”  Rather, it tells men what they are to do, what to avoid, 
and paints the joys of heaven and pains of hell in vivid sensual images.  At times polemical, at 
times oracular, it is also (especially in its earlier chapters) full of visionary enthusiasm.  To a 
Western mind it leaves an impression of great confusion, repetition, sometimes inconsistency.  Its 
chapters (s ra) can be variously ordered, and pass from one subject to another without obvious 
transitions.  When attention is given to how it was composed, its structure (or lack of it) becomes 
more intelligible.  Muhammad claimed that it was dictated to him piecemeal, over a long period 
of time, and he in turn repeated its elements to his scribes.  Sometimes these repetitions were 
immediate, sometimes only when he later recalled them.  He sometimes had bits inserted and at 
other times erased or ‘abrogated’ elements.  And it is even admitted in the Qur’ n that Allah 
caused him to forget some revelations.(87:7) But the Qur’ n is also poetry, “bold and tender in a 
way already reminiscent of later Spanish chivalry”, as Hegel describes it, and must be read as 
poetry.  The Qur’ n is written in a tongue which Albert Hourani calls “The Language of Poetry”53, 
a common poetic language which emerged out of the dialects of Arabic.  
 
 Islam is a positive religion, as are Judaism and Christianity, that is, having scriptures 
which are taken as God’s revelation to the believer; and after a period of time, having a developed 
doctrine which measures who is a true believer, thus having a certain externality.  Everything, 
                                                           
50. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ed. Haldane and Simson, III, 32.  What is said here is true of 
the Asharite tradition, the tradition of the vast majority of Muslims to this day.  It is not true of the 
Mutazilites.  For their difference, see infra. 
51. These elements are reported by Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, 1.71, quoted in Hegel, “Arabic 
Philosophy” in Lectures on the History of Philosophy (ed. Brown), 37. 
52. Brown, 38-9.  
53.Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, London,1991, 12. 
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says Hegel, must initially come to us from outside.  Civil laws are something positive, are simply 
given to us by legislators, are binding on us at first simply because they are the laws of the land.  
But when we have thought about the law, when we find it rational that crime should be punished, 
then the positivity of the law becomes our own, is valid for us rationally.  The rules we impose on 
our children, that they must tell the truth, be polite, brush their teeth, over time become their own 
rules and are no longer imposed externally.  The positivity of religion, its doctrines and moral 
precepts, need not detract from its character as rational simply because it is first posited in 
scriptures and doctrine.  But if a religion is positive according to its nature then it has nothing 
rational in it.  The Jewish religion has elements that seem to be irremediably positive: as Hegel 
observes, the most trifling regulations, those for example concerning the arrangement of the 
tabernacle, or those pertaining to sacrifices and other ceremonies, are given as divine command: 
“God says...” , and these are side by side with the completely rational Law of Moses.  But the 
Torah presents also passages of the highest rationality: the account of creation, the Fall, God’s 
characterization of Himself as “I am”.  Apart from its central thesis, that God is One and thus 
Spirit, the Qur’ n presents Islam as wholly positive.  Allah can turn night into day, undo what has 
been done, his activity presented as utterly contingent and devoid of reason.  
 
3. The Christian Religion 
 
 The Christian religion is positive insofar as it has been given to humanity externally, from 
without, in history.  For the Christian, it appeared “in the fullness of time”, as emerging out of the 
great spiritual needs of all mankind, by then entirely manifest when Christ was born into the 
world.  But what was revealed is that Christ himself, the one who reveals God’s nature to 
mankind, belongs as Son of God to the nature of God.  Christians believe this not on the strength 
of miracles or through some dictation of an angel, but by the “witness of the spirit”, as wholly 
commensurate with their spirit.  Christ proclaims the unity of human and divine and is Himself 
that unity.  The Christian likewise believes and witnesses to that same unity.  Thus, the content of 
the Christian religion, though positive as given to the believer, demands that it become his own, 
an object of thought.  It is not simply revealed but revelatory.  Thus there arises out of this faith in 
its earliest centuries the need of an intellectus fidei, a need that cannot fully be satisfied until, after 
long centuries in which the faith has informed the institutions and historical life of its people, a 
new philosophy equal to the task arises. 
 
 St. Paul’s Epistles might be thought the first elements of that intellectus fidei.  His 
resolution of the controversies in the early Christian communities was to a higher authority than 
could be tolerated in a fanatical positivism: “The letter killeth, the spirit gives life.”  Patristic 
theology, although prompted by heresies which would undermine the unity of faith of Christians, 
was “the explication and discovery to the Church of what it thinks.”54  It is in this spirit that the 
Church discovers the Doctrine of the Trinity.55 
 
 In the revelation that Christ is the Son of God, that “I and the Father are one”, known to 
Christians by the “witness of the Spirit”, the Spirit whom the Father would send only with the 
death of Jesus, there is given in inchoate form the doctrine of Trinity which the Church Fathers 
must render intelligible.  Because the Spirit is present to the community of Christ’s followers – is 
                                                           
54.James Doull, “The Christian Origin of Contemporary Institutions”, Part II, Dionysius, Vol. VIII (1984), 79. 
55.Ibid., 81-103. 
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present to the human spirit therefore – they can see “Indeed this man was the Son of God”, that 
this man Jesus is the revelation of God and is himself divine.  This they know through the Spirit, 
the divinity in the believing community, and as the self-movement within God himself.  If 
metaphorically they give names to the moments of this self-movement – Father, Son, Spirit – it is 
the theologians who must give precision to the orthodox belief that God brings forth from Himself 
his own opposite, his other in every way equal to himself, and knowing himself in his other, loves 
his other in himself and himself in his other.  God therefore has an inner trinitarian life of the 
outpouring of himself and the reconciliation of what he has brought forth with himself.  God is 
not merely being but living, actual, self-determined (thus free) being. 
 
 Without God’s self-revelation as trinity of divine relationships, hence of persons, in an 
infinite unity, given to the believer in the witness of the indwelling Spirit, he could not know this.  
But once it is his, reason can grasp that God must necessarily enjoy this trinitarian life, that God 
could not be God as isolated and alone.  God must be triune.  When God creates a world, it too is 
the self-determination, self-revelation of God, in which He knows himself.  When out of the slime 
of that world, God brings forth man made in his image, that same trinitarian life the believer 
comes to know as also his life.  The world which confronts him as other and external is his own 
externality, which in knowing he comes to know himself.  But only modern philosophy 
understood systematically (in Hegel’s sense) is able to give precision to this. 
 
 
II.  Islam And Christendom: Religion In The World 
 
 Since our interest here is to explore how we in the West, Christian civilization at least in 
origin and inspiration, might live in peace with Muslims, we turn from the differences of these 
religions to their manifestation in the world.  It might be noted that, after the Bar Kokhba revolt 
and their expulsion from Palestine in 135 AD, Jews in the Diaspora of the centuries which 
followed lived according to the principle first articulated by Samuel, the rabbinic authority in 
Babylon where many of the Jews had fled after the exile: “The law of the land is the law.”  Jews 
regarded themselves as  guests in any country where they resided in the Diaspora, and were 
obligated to adhere to the host country's laws. Until, as was their fervent hope, they were able to 
return to the land of their forefathers, there could be no civilizational expression which was 
properly Jewish.  Let us move then to the Muslims and the Christians. 
 
 “For the first thousand years or so of the long struggle between the two world systems, the 
Muslims on the whole had the upper hand.”56   In the early centuries Muslims were largely 
indifferent to the “infidels”, whom they regarded as uncivilized barbarians.  This was by any 
objective measure largely the case.  While barbaric hordes were pillaging and plundering across 
Europe, Islam was the greatest military and economic power in the world.  Its armies out of 
Arabia conquered Syria, Egypt, Palestine, North Africa, in the seventh century (its first century), 
then in the eighth century it conquered Spain and Portugal, and invaded France where the 
Muslims were finally turned back by Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours in 732.  But they went 
on in the ninth century to conquer Sicily and invade the Italian penisula, sacking Ostia and Rome.  
Islam had highly developed arts and sciences, preserved Greek science and philosophy, possessed 
a  commercial and communications network throughout Europe, Asia and Africa.  Even as 
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Christendom gradually emerged as a potential military rival to Islam,  Muslims’ sense of 
themselves was that civilization and culture were one with Islam itself, that is, they  understood 
their superiority to be directly linked to their religion.  “The religion of Islam is essentially a 
religion of success; it is a winner’s religion”, writes Daniel Pipes. “ In the year 1000, say, Islam 
was on top no matter what index of worldly success one looks at – health, literacy, culture, power.  
This association become customary and assumed: to be a Muslim was to be a favourite of God, a 
winner.”57 
 
1.  The Success of Islam 
 
 How did this happen?  There were a host of external conditions: the decline of the 
Mediterranean world because of barbaric invasions, agricultural failures and shrinking urban 
markets; the weakening of the  Byzantine and Sasanian (Iranian) Empires by epidemics of the 
plague and long wars; and the indifference of the city dwellers of these two empires who did not 
care who ruled them as long as they could have a certain security, reasonable taxes and peace.  
When Muhammad’s new movement first appeared in Mecca, it aroused suspicion even in his own 
tribe.  Pressures and perhaps even persecution drove him to leave Mecca for the oasis at Yathrib 
(renamed Medina, “the city”) where he and his followers were welcomed, the migration we know 
as the Hijra.  In the Muslim calendar, the year of this migration (622 AD) is the first year in 
Islam. Here in Medina, Muhammad became a ruler, with political and military power to shore up 
his spiritual authority.  Soon this Muslim city was involved in warfare with Mecca, which he 
conquered eight years later, establishing Islam there in place of the polytheism he had himself 
abjured much earlier.58  Medina, the umma or community, had become a state and would soon be 
the seat of an empire.   
 
 It was inevitable early in its foundation that Islam would be more than a religion, that a 
separation of ‘church and state’ would not be appropriate to it.  The Qur’ n enjoins Muslims to 
“obey God, obey his Prophet, and obey those in authority over you”(4:59). At the death of the 
Prophet, the question of his successor was controversial, resulting in what came to be the division 
of Islam itself.  First there were the Sunnis,  those who believed that prophesy was then 
completed, and what was required was a secular succession, an ordinary person elected by the 
umma who would rule according to strict Islamic law.  Opposed to that view were the Shi’ites 
who believed in a continuity of prophesy, where succeeding imams have access to divine 
revelation through the “hidden” imam working behind the scenes, inspiring them.  Thus the 
division itself has at its heart a conflict between religion and secularity. 
 
 The precepts and practices of the Prophet were handed down orally for generations and 
later written down.  These admonitions and examples are revered by most Muslims as extensions 
of the Qur’ n and together form the basis of the Holy Law, further interpreted and elaborated by 
later generations of Islamic jurists, the mufti, whose judgments or rulings are the fatw .  These 
laws extend to every aspect of Muslim life, domestic, economic, political, social, aesthetic, as 
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 Â   .Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
June 30, 1998. [http://www.sullivan-county.com/id3/islamism.htm]| 
58. The Middle East , 52-3. 
F. E. DOULL:  PEACE WITH ISLAM 
 
 
 
15 
well as religious.59    Thus, all law for the Muslim is divine law revealed by Allah.60 This 
universalism implicit in Muhammad’s teaching and practice asserted itself even in his own day: 
he sent military expeditions to the Byzantine frontier and emissaries to the rulers of the day, 
calling on them to accept Islam.  After his death, his successor, Abu Bakr, created an organized 
army and the enthusiasm – some might say fanaticism61 -- of the Muslims, moved by the fervour 
of their convictions, as also by the prospect of land and wealth, was such that the Near East was 
remade: the center of political life moved from the rich, populous Fertile Crescent to the small 
town of Medina on the western edge of the Arabian peninsula. 
 
 Two centuries after the death of the Prophet there were two distinct schools of Islamic 
speculative theology, the Mutazilites who in the 8th century were the first Muslims to apply Greek 
philosophy to Islamic doctrine, and the Asharites, the “nominalists of Islam” 62, followers of the 
10th century orthodox theologian al-Ashari.  Acknowledging the absolute oneness of God, the 
Mutazilites reasoned therefore that the Qur’ n could not legitimately be thought the co-eternal 
word of God, which was the orthodox view, but was rather created.  There was place therefore for 
a realm of truth and morality not derived from religion, a rationality or secularity not simply given 
in the Qur’ n.  For more than a century the doctrine of the created Qur’ n was state dogma, 
proclaimed in 827 under the caliph al-Ma’m n.  But in 932, al-Ashari, an established theologian, 
renounced the Mutazilah, broke the force of their rationalism, and using atomist principles 
returned to the earlier orthodoxy where God’s omnipotence is not bound by morality or causality, 
and therefore morality cannot be discovered by reason. There is thus nothing true, nothing good, 
except insofar as it was given in religion.  This is the orthodox position of the vast majority of 
Muslims even today, especially among the Sunnis who account for approximately ninety percent 
of the Muslim population.63 
  
                                                           
59
.Theologians committed to a “reformed Islam” draw a distinction between portions of the Qur’ n revealed in Mecca 
(where Mohammed was strictly a prophet) and those revealed in Medina where he ran a state and his successors an 
empire.  The Medina revelation, they argue, is only one possible application of Mecca’s religious and moral 
principles.  We shall return to this subsequently. 
60.There is a fascinating story recounted by Bernard Lewis of a Muslim visitor to England in the 18th century who left 
an account of his visit.  He described a visit to the House of Commons, whose astonishing function was to make laws 
and fix penalties for wrongdoers.  “Unlike the Muslims, he explained to his readers, the English have not accepted a 
divine law revealed from heaven, and were therefore reduced to the expedient of making their own laws...”  The 
Middle East, London, 1995.  
61.“Fanaticism” is an enthusiasm for something abstract, and in the case of Islam, to have an entirely negative 
destructive and negative relation to the established order.  Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of History, 356.  
62.The apt characterization of Abdolkarim Soroush, foremost Iranian and Islamic political philosopher and theologian. 
63.It is for this reason also that the Qur’ n is recited rather than read. “The individual act of reading the Bible 
constituted an intellectually revolutionary development in that it brought about a crucial transition, which might be 
described as a transition from rhetoric to hermeneutics.  In the Arab world traditional patriarchal culture never 
promoted the reading of the Qur’ n, even after it became widely available following the introduction of printing in 
the nineteenth century.  To this day it is still recited, chanted, and repeated by heart but not, or rarely, read.  
Interpretation has remained the monopoly of specialists or religious officials, whose exegesis, moreover, derives less 
from the sacred text than traditional commentaries on it.” Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted 
Change in Arab Society, New York and Oxford, 1988, 87; quoted in Mehrzad Boroujerdi, “Can Islam be 
Secularized?”, In Transition: Essays on Culture and Identity in the Middle Eastern Society, ed. M. R. Ghanoonparvar 
and Faridoun Farrokh, Laredo, TX, 1994, 58. 
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 The Muslim Empire saw the gradual disappearance of unitary government, but nothing 
seemed to stop its phenomenal growth.  In the 8th century, the Muslim population of Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Spain was less than 10%; by the 10th century a large part of the population 
was Muslim.  Among the reasons for such success, we should note that Islam was by that time 
clearly defined, and the line between Muslim and non-Muslim sharply drawn.  They had an 
elaborate system of ritual, doctrine and law. In order to preserve the absoluteness of Islam, the 
non-Moslem could at best be tolerated within the Moslem milieu. The status of the non-Muslim 
was therefore precisely defined as inferior in these ways: non-Muslims paid a special poll tax 
(jizya) to live under the protection of a Muslim state; their clothes had to be of a certain kind and 
certain colours avoided; they could not carry arms or ride horses, but must use donkeys or mules 
instead; they could not marry Muslim women, their evidence was not accepted against Muslims in 
Islamic courts; their houses of worship could not be ostentatious nor could they build new ones; 
they were excluded from positions of power.64  Thus there were less than subtle inducements to 
convert.65  Moreover, for those who did convert, there was immediate equality with their Muslim 
brothers. 
 
 Another reason for the phenomenal growth of Islam was that through the conquests Arabic 
became a universal language.  As the language of the Qur’ n, it was transmitted with the religion.  
The language of the Qur’ n was the paradigm of classical Arabic.  In the 8th and 9th centuries, 
lexicography, grammar, literary theory – the sciences of language – were created and studied by 
those for whom Arabic was a second language.  Scholars collected the ancient poetry of Arabia 
and in the 9th and subsequent centuries poetry itself flourished.  Later there was the high literature 
of a new kind of Persian, written in Arabic script and a vocabulary enriched with Arabic words.  
The epic poetry recording the history of Iran in pre-Islamic times was revived and written in the 
new Persian.  Muslim countries were not generally interested in their pre-Islamic past. 
 
 By the 10th century, there was a recognizable “Islamic World”.66  We stand in awe today 
of its great architecture from Cordoba to Iraq – mosques surrounded by other religious buildings 
(courthouses, hospitals, hostels for travellers and pilgrims), shrines such as the Ka’ba in Mecca, 
the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, the tomb of Abraham at Hebron, Muhammad’s tomb in 
Medina, and then of course the great palaces (the Alhambra in Granada is much later, a 14th 
century masterpiece).  Walls of public buildings were covered with decorations: those endlessly 
iterating geometric forms or highly stylized representations  of plants and flowers.67  The 
calligrapher’s art held a special significance for Muslims, especially copying words of the Qur’ n 
where Allah was revealed to the world.68 
 
 The great cities of Islam in subsequent centuries were the largest in the western world: 
Cairo and Baghdad with a quarter of a million inhabitants each were two or three times as large as 
any city in western Europe.  Then there were Cordoba, Granada, Seville in Andalus, Fez and 
Marrakish in Morocco, Damascus and Aleppo in Syria, Mosul and Basra in Iraq, the cities of Iran 
                                                           
64.Albert Hourani, 47.  
65. But the Qur’ n is quite explicit that there must be no forced conversions: “There is no compulsion in religion”, 
2:256. 
66.Hourani, 54. 
67.Although not explicitly forbidden in the Qur’ n, Islamic jurists generally held that the depiction of living forms was 
improper in religious buildings, reasoning that Allah alone has the power to create life.  Cf. Hourani, 56. 
68.Hourani, 56.   
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and of northern India, each the equal in size if not in grandeur of Paris, Florence, Venice and 
Rome. 
 
 In addition to this worldly success, or rather inseparable from it, we must note what Islam 
accomplished spiritually or religiously for its followers, and for the wider world.  Initially it 
brought them out of the benightedness of the polytheism and idolatry of the Arabian peninsula.  
Then in Medina, Muhammad rejected the exclusivist claim of the Jews that they were uniquely 
related to the one God, proclaiming instead that Allah69 was the one God of all humanity.  Islam 
brought monotheism and the whole rich civilization emanating from it to many lands and peoples, 
to Hindu and Buddhist as well as Zoroastrian and Manichean. But even more significantly, they 
offered a universal religion and universal civilization in place of particular peoples with gods 
peculiar to themselves. 
 
2. Islamic Social Order 
 
 It is said that Islam is an egalitarian religion.  It explicitly rejects privilege based on birth, 
race, wealth, rank.  “O, people. We have created you from one male and one female, and we have 
made you into peoples and tribes that you might know one another.  Indeed the noblest among 
you in the sight of God is the most God-fearing.” (Qur’ n, 49:13)  Islam brought to its adherents 
their equality with one another.  But certain western historians70 are quick to note that there were 
three inequalities sanctioned, if not sanctified, in the religion and therefore in the Islamic empires: 
the inequality of master and slave, of man and woman, of Muslim and non-Muslim.  Each of 
these relations was regulated in Islamic law, accepted therefore but also mitigated and restricted 
in practice.  To what has been said already of  the difference of Muslim and non-Muslim in the 
Islamic world, there was the result that as Muslims were increasingly numerous in the lands they 
conquered, they were able to conduct their lives in virtual separation from non-Muslims. 
Tolerated non-Muslims (dhimm ) were principally Jews and Christians, “People of the Book” in 
Islam and therefore possessing some elements of the revelation of Allah (however confused and 
misinterpreted).  Other non-Muslims would more likely be slaves.  The treatment of Jews and 
Muslims in Christendom was generally not as liberal as their treatment in Muslim states. 
 
 Slavery was a universally accepted institution, as we know, until more or less recent times.  
In the conquest of foreign lands, it was inevitable and anticipated in the Holy Law that hordes 
would be either slaughtered or enslaved by the great Muslim armies.  Some slaves were drafted 
into the military itself, others brought into agricultural or domestic service.  Slaves were also 
bought and sold, especially concubines (generally white) and domestic servants (frequently 
black).  Masters were exhorted to treat their slaves with justice and kindness, and the Qur’ n 
praises the master who would free a slave.  Muslims could not enslave other Muslims, and 
normally did not enslave other “Peoples of the Book”.  The practice was, if anything, less cruel 
than in medieval Christendom simply because it was based on fixed law. Although the slave 
                                                           
69.Given that Muhammad saw no conflict between the word of God as revealed to the Jewish prophets and to Jesus 
and the apostles, one might ask why he did not use the Hebrew or Greek name for God, instead of Allah, the name in 
Arabic for the pagan Supreme Being.  This is but a consequence of the absence of a translation of the 
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70.Cf. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong, Oxford, 2002, 82-95; The Middle East, 205-217.  The Lebanese historian, 
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could not give evidence in an Islamic court, and the penalty for an offense against a slave was half 
the penalty for such an offense against a free man, still the slave was entitled to food, medical 
attention and support in his old age, and the court could order that the slave be freed if his master 
failed in these obligations.    
 
 The Qur’ n conceives ultimately an equality of destiny for the sexes, stating of men and 
women, “Whosoever does an evil deed shall be recompensed only with the like of it, but 
whosoever does a righteous deed, be it male or female, believing shall enter Paradise, therein 
provided without reckoning.” (40:40, Cf.16:97.  But the status of women in conduct and law was 
not equal to that of men.  Women, except poor women, were confined largely to the home, and to 
the extent that a family was wealthy, powerful or respected, women in the home were secluded in 
that special part of the home called the harim.  On the relatively rare occasions when they 
emerged, they were veiled.  An Egyptian jurist of the 14th century reflected: “Some of the pious 
elders (may God be pleased with them) have said that a woman should leave her house on three 
occasions only: when she is conducted to the house of her bridegroom, on the deaths of her 
parents, and when she goes to her own grave.”71  The social order was predicated on superior 
rights and powers for men.  Men could divorce their wives by simple repudiation, whereas 
women needed cause.72  Men could have more than one wife (up to four) if he could provide for 
them adequately, and also slave concubines up to any number.  In an Islamic court, the testimony 
of a woman counted for only half the weight of the testimony of a man, and daughters could 
inherit only half as much as sons.  As Bernard Lewis observes, the non-Muslim could overcome 
his inequality by conversion to Islam, and the slave might be freed by his master, but the 
inequality of the woman could never be redressed.  It remains to this day the most difficult 
liberation to achieve in Islam. 
 
3. Islam and Terror 
 
 It is undeniable that in the past Muslims resorted to war to bring the “infidels” under the 
umbrella of Islam.  The Prophet was himself quite early on drawn into armed conflict against his 
own tribe: “When Quraysh [the tribe] became insolent towards God and rejected His gracious 
purpose...He gave permission to His apostle to fight and protect himself.” 73  But does the religion 
countenance the violence and terrorism of al-Qaeda or Hezbollah, or the fatw  issued by Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1989 against the novelist Salman Rushdie?74  There are significant departures from 
Islamic law in both cases.  Concerning the actions of the Ayatollah, there are these irregularities 
about this particular fatw : the ayatollah pronounced a death sentence, recruited would-be 
assassins, and did all this without attention to the requirement under Islamic law that the accused 
                                                           
71.Quoted in Hourani, 120. 
72. Impotence, madness, denial of her rights to clothing, lodging, maintenance and sexual relations were acceptable 
causes. 
73.Quoted Hourani, 18.  The Qur’ n: “Prophet, make war on the unbelievers and the hypocrites and deal sternly with 
them.  Hell shall be their home, evil their fate.” [Prohibition, 66:9] 
74.A fatw  is not, as some might think from the manner in which this particular one was issued, a murder contract after 
the manner of the mafiosi. It is a legal opinion or ruling on a point of Islamic law, and the Islamic jurist authorized to 
issue it is the mufti.   
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be brought to trial and given the opportunity to defend himself against the charge.  And there are 
more serious reservations about the terrorist activities of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.75 
   
 A Muslim sect known as the Assassins were active in Iran and Syria from the eleventh to 
the thirteenth centuries against certain Muslim rulers whom they regarded as unjust usurpers.  
They called themselves fidayeen, “one who is ready to sacrifice his life for the cause”76.   They 
were signally different from the contemporary fidayeen suicide bomber. The victim was always a 
leader – political, religious or military – identified as a source of great evil; the weapon, a dagger, 
which meant that the assassin had to encounter his target quite directly.  Thus, the assassin could 
well expect not to survive the action he took.  This was not an act of suicide, but death at the 
hands of the bodyguards of his victim.  Suicide is proscribed in the strongest terms in Islamic 
law77.  Moreover, the slaughter of innocent civilians, which in the case of contemporary terrorists 
is the objective, as in the destruction of the World Trade Center, is without precedent in Islam.  
For this reason, a distinction is now drawn between Islam, the religious tradition dating back 
thirteen hundred years, and “Islamism”, that contemporary fanaticism which has spawned suicide 
bombers and other such terrorists, a new ideology which clothes itself in words of old: “infidels”, 
“crusaders”, “Martyrs”, “jihad”, etc.78  As the Boroumand sisters put it, 
 
... this religious vocabulary hides violent Islamism’s true nature as a modern totalitarian 
challenge to both traditional Islam and modern democracy.  If terrorism is truly as close to 
the core of Islamic belief as both the Islamists and many of their enemies claim, why does 
international Islamist terrorism date only to 1979? ... The truth is that contemporary 
Islamist terror is an eminently modern practice thoroughly at odds with Islamic traditions 
and ethics.79 
 
 If not Islam itself, what then are the roots of this contemporary Islamism of Osama bin 
Laden, al-Qaeda, the suicide bombers in Israel and other such terrorists?  Are they representative 
of one side in the “clash of civilizations” predicted by Samuel Huntington?  They do not aim in 
general aim to restore a strict traditional Islamic practice.  Ladan and Roya Boroumand see their 
origin rather in 20th century organizations of the extreme right and left.  One such organization is 
the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna and modelled on Italian 
Facist principles – its slogan, “action, obedience, silence” and its idea of unquestioned loyalty to a 
leader clearly are inspired by Mussolini’s “believe, obey, fight”.   On the left, there was the 
Marxist movement founded by Maulana Mawdudi in Pakistan in the early ‘40s, opposed both to 
                                                           
75.On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden, together with Jihad groups in Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh, issued 
their own fatw  in their “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders”, laying 
down that “to kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is 
able, in any country where this is possible, until the Aqsa mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Har m mosque [in Mecca] 
are freed from their grip, and until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the lands of Islam, 
incapable of threatening any Muslim.”  In Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, 2003, xxv. Henceforth Crisis. 
76. Crisis, 123.  
77.  Cf. this passage from the traditions of the Prophet: “The Prophet said: Whoever kills himself with a blade will be 
tormented with that blade in the fires of Hell.  The Prophet also said: He who strangles himself will strangle himself 
in Hell ... etc. Whoever kills himself in any way in this world will be tormented with it on the day of resurrection.” In 
Crisis, 131. 
78.As well, “Islamist” rather than “Islamic”, where the former is actually in conflict with authentic Islam. 
79.Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, “Terror, Islam, and Democracy”, Journal of Democracy 13 (2002), 6.  
Henceforth Boroumand. 
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the West and to traditional Islam.  These strands from left and right came together in Sayyid Qutb 
who called for a monolithic Muslim state led by an Islamic party which would use every violent 
means necessary to achieve its ends, a classless society, where the “selfish individual” is 
annihilated and the “exploitation of man by man” is ended -- “Leninism in Islamic dress” as the 
Boroumands describe it, the creed embraced by most young Islamist cadres today.80   
 
 Thus, when Muslims here or elsewhere flatly deny that Islam condones terrorism, when 
they assert instead that it is a religion of peace, of justice, when they are appalled that the West 
thinks of them as implicitly supporting terrorism, they are to be believed.  Present day Islamist 
terrorists are as opposed to them as they are to the West. But this does not mean that the West can 
feel confident that Islamic civilization is on the same side as they are, or that Muslims themselves 
remain true to their Islamic principles.   
 
4.  The Limit of Islam 
 
 For centuries Islam was civilization itself.  Muslims viewed themselves as the possessors 
of God’s truth with the obligation of bringing it to all mankind.  If they were in a state of 
perpetual war against the infidel, it was war whose outcome was inevitable and certain -- the 
civitas dei would overcome the civitas terrena, Islam would triumph over unbelief and the whole 
world would be converted to it.  Their convictions were confirmed with the Ottoman successes in 
the 15th and 16th centuries.  With the loss of Ottoman territories in Europe in the 18th century, the 
question raised by the Ottomans was not “Who did this to us?”, but “What did we do wrong?”.  
The answer they gave was this, according to Bernard Lewis: “The basic fault, according to most 
of these memoranda, was falling away from the good old ways, Islamic and Ottoman; the basic 
remedy was a return to them.  This diagnosis and prescription still command wide acceptance in 
the Middle East.”81  But as we in the West look at that same history, our diagnosis is perhaps 
different.  Lewis, reflecting on what has come to pass, offers this account: 
 
In the late S.D. Goitein’s felicitous phrase, the Islamic world was ‘the intermediate 
civilization’ – intermediate in both time and space.  Its outer limits were in southern 
Europe, in Central Africa, in southern and southeastern and eastern Asia, and it embraced 
elements of all of these.  It was also intermediate in time, between antiquity and 
modernity, sharing the Hellenistic and Judaeo-Christian heritage with Europe and 
enriching it with elements from remoter lands and cultures.  Of the alternative routes from 
Hellenistic antiquity to modern times, it might well have seemed that it was the Islamic 
civilization of the Arabs, rather than those of Greek or Latin Christendom, that offered the 
greater promise of advancing toward a modern and universal civilization. 
 
Yet it was the poor, parochial, monochrome culture of Christian Europe that advanced 
from strength to strength, while the Islamic civilization of the Middle East suffered a loss 
of creativity, of energy, and of power. Its subsequent development has been overshadowed 
                                                           
80.Boroumand, 7-9.  See also Francis Fukuyama and Nadav Samin, “Can Any Good Come of Radical Islam?  A 
Modernizing Force?  Maybe.” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2002. 
81. What Went Wrong, 23. 
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by a growing awareness of this loss, the search for its causes, and a passionate desire to 
restore its bygone glories.82   
 
 Over and above these reflections of an historian and the conundrum that a contemporary 
Muslim faces, what must be said is this, that after a millennium and a half the Christian world 
finally took possession of its principle, the principle of freedom.  It is this principle which is 
asserted in the Reformation.  As Hegel says, “This is the essence of the Reformation: Man is in 
his very nature destined to be free.”83  It is not from the external authority of the Church, nor of a 
book, but from the internal authority of conscience, now matured after those many centuries of 
Christianization which formed it, that man finds relation to God.  Conscience had made its own 
those same principles which had formerly been imposed on it.  As the external authority of the 
priest was replaced by the internal authority of conscience, so reason was emancipated from 
dogma and a presumed creed.84  But as in the first case, this was a reason formed and informed by 
the faith from which it freed itself.  The reformed Christian knew also that the absolute truth was 
not only beyond the world but incarnate in the world. There was engendered an intense interest in 
every element of worldly life, now conducted from that same self-determination which the 
Christian religion had formed in men. This is the foundation of the modern world. 
 
The principle of the European mind is, therefore, self-conscious Reason which is 
confident that for it there can be no insuperable barrier and which therefore takes an 
interest in everything in order to become present to itself therein.  The European mind 
opposes the world to itself, makes itself free of it, but in turn annuls this opposition, takes 
its Other, the manifold, back into itself, into its unitary nature.  In Europe, therefore, there 
prevails this infinite thirst for knowledge which is alien to other races.  The European is 
interested in the world, he wants to know it, to make this Other confronting him his own, 
to bring to view the genus, law, universal, thought, the inner rationality, in the particular 
forms of the world.85 
 
 The Christian revelation, of God incarnate and trinitarian, is blasphemy to the Muslim.  
The principle of freedom, of self-determination, given in that revelation and reaching its maturity 
in the lives of Christians in the 16th and 17th centuries is only intelligible to the Muslim as gross 
distortion of the true revelation.  But has his religion then shut him off from the modern world? 
 
 
III. Religion And Secularity 
 
 It follows from what has been said that the foundation for a knowledge of human freedom 
is the Trinitarian doctrine of the Christian religion. Although the grounds for this knowledge were 
present since the revelation of the Christian religion, it required the mediation of history and the 
emergence of Christian institutions for this knowledge to become universally known.  God’s 
trinitarian life as the foundation for our trinitarian life, God’s self-determination as the paradigm 
for our self-determination, was the source of seventeenth and eighteenth century doctrines of the 
                                                           
82.The Middle East, 270. 
83.Philosophy of History, 417. 
84.Philosophy was no longer ancilla theologiae. 
85. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, “Anthropology”, §393, Zusatz. 
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equality of all men, their inalienable rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”, of a 
universal humanity which transcends differences of race, language, culture and creed. Can the 
Muslim have access to these principles, to doctrines of human rights, and the principle of freedom 
which underlies them?   
 
  Abdolkarim Soroush, the renowned contemporary Iranian philosopher who is in the 
vanguard of those Muslims who aim at reconciling Islam and the modern world, would urge 
Muslims first to distinguish religion, which is eternal, and people’s understanding of religion, 
which is necessarily limited to its own time and place.  “It is up to God to reveal a religion, but up 
to us to understand and realize it.”86  Religious knowledge is “entirely human and subject to all 
the dictates of human knowledge.”  It is “incomplete, impure, insufficient, culture bound.”  
Religion is constant, religious understanding is what changes.  “Constant, eternal religion begets 
changing and evolving religious knowledge.”87 And concerning the Qur’ n itself, he would 
remind the hearer that not everything said by the Prophet is prophesy; not everything written by 
the Prophet is religious.88  The Qur’ n is a created thing, calling forth human interpretation.  
Soroush sympathizes with those who would distinguish the elements in it revealed in Mecca, the 
universal elements appropriate for all times, from those revealed in Medina, appropriate to its 
own time and circumstances.  To the latter belong those elements most offensive to a modern 
sensibility, the three inequalities discussed earlier and the more violent and militaristic 
pronouncements quoted today by angry Muslim fundamentalists. 
 
 Soroush, in the tradition of the Mutazilites, proceeds from a rationality not confined to 
religion, a free and independent thought which is thoroughly modern in its assertions as distinct 
from its presuppositions.  “Modern humanity aims to create the world in its own image rather than 
accepting it as it is.  Nothing is deemed indisputably ‘given’.” 89  This leads him to an essentially 
modern view of the relation of secular government to religion.  “Every government, in order to 
survive and endure, needs two things: a source of legitimation and a normative framework. ... 
Nowadays (roughly the last three hundred years) governments derive their legitimacy from the 
consent of the governed.  The norms of governance too, are determined, in theory at least, by laws 
established by institutions representing the people.”90 But Soroush’s requirement of the separation 
of religion and government is motivated by “the belief in the fundamental truth of religion 
coupled with concern over its contamination and profanation by political concerns”, in short, by a 
conviction in the discontinuity and incongruity of the sacred and the secular, and hence an 
instability in the relation.  The two are not drawn into one view as in the relation of the divine and 
human in the Christian religion. 
 
 In a liberal democracy we suppose that a citizen’s particular interests have a fundamental 
right to assert themselves, limited only by the competing interests of others in society.  The 
collision of such interests is resolved in each surrendering something to the others.  This might be 
a solution where the particular interests are simply particular, but religion makes universal 
demands of the believer.  Only where a common secular life is stronger in its citizens than their 
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87. Soroush, 33. 
88.From an address given in May, 2004, at Catholic University in Washington. 
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different religions will such a resolution be tolerable.  Modern secular culture assimilates Jew, 
Muslim, Christian,  to one another.  But this is only acceptable if it is comprehensive of their 
differences.  Hegel in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion examines the different religions 
in which men have found relation to the divine, and measuring them by their conformity to what 
he calls the Idea, he uncovers in each of them that element which is the truth of that religion, a 
truth preserved in the Christian religion, the absolute or consummate religion, without which it 
would not be absolute.  The argument for Hegel’s position must be left for another time.  But here 
I might observe that no contemporary self-respecting Jew or Muslim is likely to find Hegel’s 
analysis acceptable.91 Moreover, even if its justification were given, it would remain theoretical 
and abstract until it found expression in secular life and the state.  We in the West have obviously 
not achieved that unity of creeds in which each is preserved and manifested in a common culture.  
We must therefore live with what we have, a state which affirms the right of all to their religious 
belief and its expression, subject only to such limits as are required by the common good.   
 
 In 1790, George Washington, replying to the warm letter he had received from the 
Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, wrote the following: 
 
The Citizens of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for 
having given to mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy: a policy worthy of 
imitation.  All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship.  It is now 
no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people 
that another enjoyed the exercise of their natural rights.  For happily the Government of 
the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, 
requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good 
citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support.  
 
...May the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to merit and 
enjoy the good will of the other inhabitants, while every one shall sit in safety under his 
own vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid.  May the father of all 
mercies scatter light and not darkness in our paths, and make us all in our several 
vocations useful here, and in his own due time and way everlastingly happy. 
 
We may hope that views such as those of Dr. Soroush will find wide acceptance in Islam, so that 
there too other religious traditions might be respected and God addressed in many names. 
 
 
                                                           
9191.In the remarkable debate between Emil Fackenheim and James Doull, first at the Marquette Symposium in 1970, 
and then continued in Dialogue that same year, Fackenheim protests that Hegel had not done justice of Judaism, nor 
to other non-Christian religions, commenting that a Jew could only follow Hegel at the price of his religion. 
